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Within the last decade there has been a considerable amount of litiga-
tion involving the issue of segregation of the races. Segregation has been
challenged and defeated in every area where the public is directly affected by
discriminatory practices. The legal basis for the strangulation of discrimina-
tion has been that it is in violation of the equal protection of the laws clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.'
In the most recent litigation of the will of Stephan Girard, the legal
microscope has been focused upon the question of the extent to which segrega-
tion can be practiced in an educational institution established by a charitable
trust. The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, in the latest action by the
courts in this case, pronounced in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 9 D. &
C. -, 137 Legal Intelligencer 52 (September 12, 1957), what it believed
to be the proper solution. It said that a private trustee would be appointed
to administer the charitable trust established by Stephan Girard. It is now
to be questioned whether this action is appropriate and whether it will be
sustained as being consistent with the policy, pertaining to racial discrimina-
tion, set down by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The instant case arose when two Negro boys, who had applied for ad-
mission to Girard College and were refused admission upon the ground that
they were of the Negro race, brought an action against the trustee, the Board
of Directors of City Trusts.' Girard's will laid down many precise terms
as to how the school was to be established and what restrictions were to be
imposed. Among these restrictions was the term "poor male white orphan
children." 8
Girard's will provided that the funds to be used for the college were
given to "the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of Philadelphia ... in trust . . ." 4
1 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 The Board of Directors of City Trusts admitted that the sole reason for its refusal was
that it had no authority to admit the applicants because of their race. See dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Musmanno, Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 623, 127 A. 2d 287 (1956).
3 The college was established and maintained exclusively by the trust funds left by the will.
4 Section XX of Stephan Girard's will.
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In 1869 the Pennsylvania legislature provided for the establishment of the
Board of Directors of City Trusts.' The Plaintiffs attacked the exclusion on
the ground, inter alia, that the trustee was actually an agent of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, and that therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment applied
and such discrimination was unconstitutional. The Orphans' Court did not
agree with this contention, and ruled that the Board's disapproval of the
applications was proper. Upon appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
this decision was upheld.6  The United States Supreme Court said in its per
curiam opinion:
"The Board which operates Girard College is an agency of the State of
Pennsylvania. Therefore, even though the Board was acting as a trustee, its
refusal to admit Foust and Felder to the college because they were Negroes
was discrimination by the State. Such discrimination is forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483, 98 Led
873, 74 SCt 686, 38 ALR 2d 1180. Accordingly, the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania is reversed and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further remanded this order to the Orphans'
Court,' which recently ruled that a private trustee would be appointed.'
It is to be noted that this comment does not include treatment of the issue
of whether the Board of Directors of City Trusts is an agent of the state so as
to bring action by the Board within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The purpose here is to treat the possible effects these and any subsequent
decisions in this litigation may have upon the trust area of the law." It will
be assumed here that the Supreme Court does not intend to broaden the legal
meaning of "state action" to the point at which there is always sufficient state
action involved in charitable trust administration to bring into play the
Fourteenth Amendment.
11
The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County has been faced with the
problem of construing the meaning of the Supreme Court's order and what
action should be taken. The policy of the Supreme Court up to this point has
5Act of June 30, 1869, P. L. 1276, 53 P.S. §§ 16365-16370 (1957).
6 Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A. 2d 287 (1956).
7 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U. S. - (1957).
8 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 26 U.S.L. Week 1005 (June 28, 1957).
9 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 9 D. & C. 2d - , 137 Legal Intelligencer 52 (Sep.
tember 12, 1957).
10 However, it is important to point out that the enactment of the Pennsylvania legislature,
which was for the purpose of establishing the Board of Directors of City Trusts, used agency
language. This is, of course, only one facet of many, involved in any discussion of this issue.
Act of June 30, 1869, P. L. 1276, 53 P.S. § 16370 (1957).
11 A certain degree of "state action" is involved in every charitable trust, e. g., probation of the
will. See 66 YALE L. J. 979 (1957).
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been unmistakably clear that segregation of the races will not be condoned
where the Fourteenth Amendment applies.12  Although it only further re-
manded the Supreme Court's order to the Orphans' Court, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has suggested what it thinks to be the proper solution. Upon
the initial appeal of this case to that court, it stated, by way of dictum, that
if the United States Supreme Court should hold that the Board of Directors
of City Trusts could not act as trustee and still discriminate, the only solution
would be to appoint a new trustee."3 When the Girard will was litigated in
1844 and 1868, the United States Supreme Court intimated on each occasion
that if the named trustee could not carry out the provisions of the trust, a
private trustee should be appointed."
The usual question raised at this point is, "What was the primary object
of the intentions of the settlor-to have the terms of his will carried out in
exact detail, i. e., 'poor male white orphan children,' or to have the appointed
trustee to continue in such capacity?" However, this is a very unrealistic
question. Stephan Girard has been dead for a century and a quarter, and
it would be mere conjecture to say what his dominant intentions would have
been had he foreseen present day influences. At best, the only thing that could
be done would be to construe all the surrounding facts existing at the time of
the creation of the will. On the one side it could be argued that he wanted
the terms of the devise to be carried out to the letter, if at all possible. This
12 To cite a few of the most prominent cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down
discrimination: Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) and Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950) (interstate commerce); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955) (colleges and
universities); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947) (restrictive covenant upon land); Rice v.
Arnold, 340 U.S. 848 (1950) and Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf courses);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(public education); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Association, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (public
parks); and Gayle v. Browder, 353 U. S. - (1956) (wherein the Supreme Court overruled
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) concerning intra-state commerce).
11 Girard Will Case, supra at page 566. "But finally, even if the Board of Directors of City
Trusts wvere deemed to be engaged in 'State action' in the administration of the Girard trust, peti-
tioners would nevertheless not be entitled to the remedy they seek. If the city, because bound in
its public or governmental actions by the inhibition imposed upon it by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, cannot carry out a provision of Girard's will in regard to the beneficiaries of the charity as
prescribed by him, the law is clear that the remedy is, not to change that provision, which, as an
individual, he had a perfect right to prescribe, but for the Orphans' Court, which has final juris-
diction over the trust which he created, to appoint another trustee."
14 In Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 Howard) 127, 188 (1844) the Supreme Court
stated:
"It is true that, if the trust be repugnant to, or inconsistent with the proper purposes for
which the corporation was created, that may furnish a ground why it may not be compellable
to execute it. But that will furnish no ground to declare the trust itself void, if otherwise
unexceptionable; but it will simply require a new trustee to be substituted by the proper
court, possessing equity jurisdiction to enforce and perfect the objects of the trust."
In Girard v. Philadelphia, 74 U.S. (7 Wallace) 1, 12 (1868) the Court again said:
"Now, if this were true [that the city could not act as trustee), the only consequence




contention could be supported by such items as the great detail of the in-
strument; the term "poor male white orphan children"; defined administration
of the college; and other terms of the will, such as that no clergyman be per-
mitted on the grounds of the college. On the other hand, it could be main-
tained that Girard, during his life, was a very generous and grateful man; that
he wanted the City of Philadelphia to benefit from his devise, and that there-
fore he was not too concerned about the segregation terms. Also other pro-
visions of the will made bequests to the municipality of Philadelphia and to
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.15 Notwithstanding these contentions,
Girard's primary object was expressly stated to be at least the establishment
of the college."
There are other considerations that must not be overlooked. Girard
drafted his will in 1830, thirty years before the Civil War and the Fourteenth
Amendment. At that time, not only was segregation legal, but enslavement
of the Negro race was lawful. It therefore, could be successfully contended
that such practices were accepted by the nation as a whole at the time of the
probation of the will.
There were several courses of action available to the Orphans' Court.
Probably the two most obvious alternatives to come to mind are the application
of the doctrine of cy pres and appointment of a private trustee. Cy pres
is usually applied by the courts only where the purposes of the trust have
become impossible or impractical to satisfy or where the trust purpose itself
has become illegal. 7  Although it might be argued successfully that cy pres
should be applied, it is nevertheless difficult to see the justification of such ap-
plication in this situation. If the Board of Directors desires to carry out the
terms of the trust, it would certainly not be impossible nor impractical to
discriminate by reason of race in acting upon the applications to Girard Col-
lege. In fact, it definitely appears that the Board desired to exercise discrimina-
tory practices when acting upon applications to the school.' 8
15 These bequests included: $500,000 to the city to pave certain streets; $300,000 to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; $30,000 provision for his "black" woman; $20,000 to deaf and
dumb institution; $10,000 to an orphan asylum; $10,000 to public schools; and others.
16 Section XXIV of Stephen Girard's will provides in part: "To all which objects the pros-
perity of the city and the health and comfort of its inhabitants I devote the said fund as aforesaid,
and direct the income thereof to be applied yearly, and every year for ever, after providing for
the college as hereinbefore directed as my primary object."
17 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399 (1935).
18 It is interesting to note that if the trustee, had decided to breach the term of the will and
thereby refuse to exclude the applicants, the present controversy would more than likely not be
before the courts. Normally the Attorney-General is charged with the responsibility of ensuring
performance of the terms of a charitable trust. However, if the Board breached the trust in this
manner, the Attorney-General would be unable to bring suit against the trustee, because this would
clearly constitute state action and thereby come within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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However, the doctrine might be applied upon the basis that it was illegal
to discriminate. This conclusion could be reached only if the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court could be so construed. There is no statute, nor
is there case law dealing with this exact situation in which it is pronounced
that exclusion by reason of race is illegal. In the opinion of the Supreme
Court the cause was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the opinion. There is considerable doubt as to what this statement means. Is
the opinion to be followed in accordance with what is stated on its face, or in
accordance with some underlying policy? Perhaps this order could be in-
terpreted as the Supreme Court's intention that discrimination in this case is
illegal. Thus, on this basis, the Orphans' Court could have applied the doc-
trine of cy pres and have eliminated the questioned exclusion term.
If the Supreme Court intended this interpretation, it was not apparent
in the language of the opinion. On its face the opinion indicated that because
of the relationship between the trustee and the State of Pennsylvania, this
discrimination was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ille-
gality for the purposes of application of cy pres has heretofore been predicated
upon the issue of whether the trust property is to be used for an object
which is in violation of the criminal law, or if the trust tends to induce the
commission of crime, or if the accomplishment of the purpose is otherwise
against public policy.'" If such action were intended, the Supreme Court
would be employing cy pres to change the term of the trust instrument without
expressly declaring that the object was against public policy, and without a
suggestion as to how it contravened public policy in this instance.
Brown v. Board of Education dealt with segregation in public education."0
By subsequent decisions it has become apparent that the Supreme Court did
not intend its ruling to be narrow, but to be applied in other areas of public
intercourse.2 It is questionable whether that court desires the Brown case to
apply to private education. This statement is predicted upon two main char-
acteristics of the Brown case. First, the court spoke only of segregation in
public education, and second, the underlying notion evolving from this opinion,
that when segregation is practiced by any public institution, it has the effect
of placing an official stamp of approval upon such conduct, which in turn has
a detrimental psychological effect upon discriminated children.
"*Restatement Trusts §§ 370, comment i; 371, comment e; 374 comment j; and 381 (1935).
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21 Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf courses); Muir v. Louisville Park




The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County refused to'employ cy pres,
but instead ordered that a private trustee would be appointed.2 By this action
it appears that this court is following the suggested solution offered by the
opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court' As was pointed out by Mr.
Chief Justice Stern in that opinion, it is hornbook law that a trust will not fail
for want of a trustee." If a trustee dies or becomes incapacitated to carry
out the objects of the settlor, the courts are not hesitant in appointing a new
trustee, unless it was clearly shown in the trust instrument that the settlor in-
tended the named trustee to be the only trustee. 5 Once again the question
of the settlor's primary object or intent presents itself, as has been discussed
above. In the appointment of another trustee, the Orphans' Court is now
faced with many incidental, but not unimportant, obstacles which must be
overcome.2" The next question is whether this latest ruling has solved the
problem involved.
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has to some extent committed it-
self by dicta when this case was appealed to that court, it is reasonably cer-
tain that it will affirm the appointment of the private trustee, if that court has
the opportunity to rule upon it. 7 However, the United States Supreme Court
might reverse this attempted solution on several grounds. One possible basis
would be that the policy underlying the Brown case applied even to private
education. Although it is doubtful the Supreme Court would rule in this
manner, such action would indeed have great impact upon private educational
institutions; but this aspect will not be treated here. Another basis for re-
versal of the Orphans' Court action would be that such discrimination of the
races is against public policy. This would not be predicated upon the Four-
teenth Amendment, because the Amendment applies only to state action (as-
suming that the Court would not rule there was sufficient state action in the
appointment of a private trustee). It would be upon the ground that the
object of the trust itself, or at least the provision in controversy, is an object
which is against the public policy. This conclusion could be reached in one
22 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 9 D. & C. 2d -, 137 Legal Intelligencer 52 (Sep-
tember 12, 1957).
22 See note 13 supra.
24 Girard Will Case, supra at page 566.
25 Restatement, Trusts § 101 (1935).
2C Some of the problems involved are: the feasibility of transferring the $98,000,000 of assets
to a new trustee; whether there should be one trust company or several of them to act as trustee
or whether the court should appoint an individual or a group of individuals; how much the
college would suffer financially; possible requirement that the statute pertaining to administration
of the school be repealed (Act of February 27, 1847, P. L. 178, P.S. §§ 16339-16344 (1957); and
whether the college would continue to qualify for tax exemption under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion (Art. IX, Sec. 1).
27 Counsel for applicants announced that it was contemplating a direct appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. The Philadelphia Inquirer, page d 3, (September 13, 1957).
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of several -ways:. the Supreme Court could announce that such discrimination
was against public polity and then proceed to give the basis for such a con-
clusion, this being 'ai application of cypres; or the Court could simply say
that such action will not be condoned and then cite Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, making it very clear that the Brown case is intended to reach to the farth-
est corner-even where the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply. There is
little doubt but that there would not be a ruling striking down the whole trust
as being against public policy or that the trust failed as a charitable trust. A
prior decision by the Supreme Court held that this is a valid charitable trust,"8
and certainly the institution is beneficial to the public.
However, if the Supreme Court reverses the appointment of a private
trustee, it will be upon the most narrow ground available. In his opinion on
the initial decision by the Orphans' Court, Judge Bolger distinguished this
case from Shelley v. Kraemer."9 In the Shelley case a landowner breached a
restrictive covenant by selling a plot of land to a Negro, which resulted in
suit being brought to enforce the covenant. Judge Bolger said:
"The Shelley, Buchanan and related cases are readily distinguishable from
the instant one, both factually and legally. For example, in those cases the
sellers of the properties were independent contractors who had the right to
elect to abide by or to breach their covenants. It was their breaching of their
covenants which resulted in the opportunity of the colored purchasers to exercise
their rights to buy and to occupy the properties. Here the Board is a fiduciary,
the mouthpiece of Stephan Girard. Its decision was to abide by the terms of the
will and to refuse to admit the applicant. From the Board's viewpoint, unless
the applicant can demonstrate he is a member of the class, 'poor male white
orphans', he has no right to admission, Soohan v. The City of Philadelphia et
al., 33 Pa. 9, and no authority was presented to the board which would sustain
the existence of such a right." 30
At that stage of the litigation, such a distinction was valid-there being no
state action required to compel the trustee to abide by the provisions of the
trust. Since the decision of the Supreme Court on the matter that the trustee
was an agent of the State, the situation has now been completely reversed. In
order for the exclusionary term in Girard's will to continue to be effective, the
Orphans' Court has decided to appoint a private trustee. In other words the
court is taking affirmative action to avoid rendering the term "white" inactive.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Shelley v. Kraemer said:
"We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing alone
cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the
2SVidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 Howard) 127 (1844).
29 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
30 Girard Estate, 4 D. & C. 2d 671, 688 (1955).
1957.]
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Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effect-
uated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has
been no action by the State and the provisions of the Amendment have not been
violated ....
"But here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the
agreements were secured only by judical enforcement by state courts of the re-
strictive terms of the agreements. The respondents urge that judical enforce-
ment of private agreement does not amount to state action; or, in any event,
the participation of the States is so attenuated in character as not to amount to
state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
"That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the
Fourteneth [Fourteenth] Amendment, is a proposition which has long been
established by decisions of this Court."
It would seem, therefore, that under this interpretation the Supreme Court
has no other alternative than to declare the appointment of a private trustee
by the Orphans' Court also to be "state action" and accordingly, within the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. If this were the course to be taken,
once again it would be illustrative of how the Supreme Court has been grad-
ually extending the fingers of the Fourteenth Amendment. By such a decision,
segregation apparently could not be continued under a charitable trust, pres-
ently in existence with an "agent" of the state acting as trustee. Only by
initial appointment by the settlor of a private trustee could discrimination be
condoned. However, this too would be subject to the Supreme Court's broad-
ening of the term "state action". 3
If the Supreme Court affirms the appointment of a private trustee, this
would impose the first significant limitation upon the policy behind the Brown
case, in that the principle announced there applies only to publicly controlled
and administered areas. Such affirmance would indicate also that exclusionary
practices in charitable trusts administered by private trustees are not sufficiently
harmful to justify alteration.
However, there might be another possible solution to the problem pre-
sented by this case, even though there might have been found a crystal clear
intent on the part of the settlor to have the exclusionary clause perpetuated.
It is well-established that the courts attempt to reach the most just result by
sound and established methods, but on occasion, when such methods are not
desirable or are unavailable, the courts will tend to improvise an approach
which will best satisfy justice's requirements." It is undisputable that citizens
of a society are subordinate to laws which reflect the policies and beliefs of
3 See note 11 supra.
82 McKee Estate, 83 D. & C. 492 (1954), aff'd per curiam 378 Pa. 607, 108 A. 2d 214 (1954).
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that society." If such were not the case, chaos would result from the practice
of complete individualism. When an individual dies and attempts to continue
his influence upon society, there is no reason why his program should suddenly
be granted an immunity from the effect of these flexible and ever-changing
laws and regulations. It is difficult to visualize how a reasonable settlor would
expect to have terms of his trust to be performed in exact detail, as drafted,
especially where the trust is beyond the scope of the rule against perpetuities.
As has been previously pointed out, Girard's will has been in effect for
a century and a quarter, and since probation of it, this country has experienced,
inter alia, a war over the issue of differential treatment of the black and white
races, and has enacted the Fourteenth Amendment. No one could logically
argue that public notions of discrimination have not changed to a considerable
degree.
Coupled with this is a necessity to examine upon what a charitable trust
depends for its existence. The usual notion for the justification of such a
trust is that it is one which is for the public benefit. The usual connotation of
the term "public benefit" is that society should receive worthwhile fruits from
the objects of the proposed trust. In other words, the public is the named
beneficiary under the terms of the instrument. It would not be a shocking
proposition to say that in order for a charitable trust to be established and to
continue as such, it must meet the demands of society of those things which
the latter believes to be for its own good.
Therefore, if it be deemed that the term, "white", in Girard's will is of
no benefit to society, or even that such a requirement is a detriment to the
public, the courts could very easily strike the term. This is not a new concept
to trust law. This method has been employed innumerable times by the courts
under the fiction of "probable intent of the settlor".
It is true that the provisions of the trust include a large enough segment
of the public to be declared charitable, when speaking of the requirement
numerically, but perhaps from the effect of the term pertaining to discrimina-
tion, the charitable purpose would be nullified by being of no benefit to any
segment of the public. The present public notion of discrimination by race
is that its only purpose is to hurt or harm or impose shame and hardship upon
the minority. In other words, the present trend of public belief is such that
discrimination by reason of race is undesirable and therefore, such action would
be of no benefit to either of the races-an illusory benefit.
38In re Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash. 648, 211 P. 734 (1922).
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However, another important consideration comes into its own at this
point, namely, the potential deterrent effect if such action were to be taken.
Society has long been handsomely rewarded by its recognition of the char-
itable trust. It will continue, no doubt, to be the desire to encourage future
gifts of charity of this sort. However, it is also a requirement of present-day
society to permit a private individual sufficient liberty to have his own personal
prejudices so long as they do not come in conflict with community values. If
the charitable trust were to be subjected too severely to the whims of the public
policy, the probable effect would be that those potential settlors, desiring re-
strictions upon the application of their gifts, would turn to the use of some
other method of perpetuating their ideals. Perhaps this evasion would also
be socially undesirable, and therefore, it is paramount that reasonable pru-
dence should be applied in determining where this nebulous line should be
drawn.
The employment of such a device would not necessarily mean a sudden
death for charitable trusts which contain other types of exclusionary terms.
For example, the charitable trust for the Negro, or the trust for girls, would
probably not be condemned. The test of whether it coincides with the public
benefit would have to be applied. It is generally believed that society is al-
ways ready to help the "underdog" and this would no doubt influence the
conclusion reached by the courts. The fallacy of such a test is that it is not
an easily ascertainable standard, and could be misapplied or overemployed to
either extreme. However, if the courts should employ this method of affecting
a cure on the ailing Girard trust, such action, and legal maneuvering included
therein, would be brightly spot-lighted by the keen interest now focused by
society upon any question involving segregation.
Humanity is constantly striving to improve itself, and on this road, society
frequently encounters crossroads. Under our system of judicial review the
courts are expected to aid in pointing to the correct way by their interpretation
of community values as well as of legal precedents. The Girard case may be
likened to one of these crossroads in the development of ideals and notions
pertaining to discrimination.
The Supreme Court of the United States must make a choice between two
basic avenues-to hold that the appointment of a private trustee is proper and
thereby permit discrimination in this situation, or to strike down the provision
in the Girard trust. If the former course is followed, either the charitable
trust will have evaded public policy at this point, or society has not been as
seriously offended by the exclusion as it might appear.
[VOL. 62
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If the latter approach is to be taken, the results will depend upon the
manner in which the Supreme Court reverses. If it concludes that the best
solution is to apply the concept of state action to this situation where the lower
court merely appointed a private trustee, then there is a possibility that the
effects would be far reaching. Such a concept could be pulled and stretched
to the point at which all forms of discriminatory behavior would be subjected
to fatal attack. Perhaps such an extreme effect would also be contrary to
public benefit. At present, however, the question remains, "Where is this line
of demarcation ?"
DAVID K. LEWIS, JR.
